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 Can Science Disprove the Existence of God?
Peter van Inwagen
In one of his essays, Sartre mentions a French Marxist writer who describes 
atheism as a “scientific” position. Sartre comments on this description as follows: 
“I recognize that in denying the existence of God, I am no less a metaphysician 
than is the believer who affirms the existence of God.” This seems to me to be 
one of the few things Sartre has said that is indisputably correct. Atheism is, 
and must be, a metaphysical, or, at any rate, a philosophical position. And any 
argument for atheism will be, and must be, a philosophical and not a scientific 
argument. A philosophical argument can, of course, have among its premises 
various facts that have been established by scientific investigation. The great 
biologist Richard Dawkins, for example, is an indefatigable champion of athe-
ism, and most of his arguments for atheism are based on what he knows best, 
the discoveries of evolutionary biology. They are, nevertheless, philosophical 
arguments—as much so as Thomas Aquinas’s argument for a First Mover or 
Descartes’s argument for the immateriality of the soul; as much so as the ar-
guments of those scientists of the present day who see the hand of God in the 
values of the parameters that occur in the laws of physics.
Now why do I say that any argument for the non-existence of God must be 
a philosophical and not a scientific argument? Science has many times shown 
that various things that people had believed in did not exist: the spontaneous 
generation of life, the rotating crystalline spheres in which the planets were 
supposedly embedded, the canals of Mars, the influence of the positions of the 
stars at the moment of one’s birth on the course of one’s life . . .  . If science 
was able to show that the crystalline spheres in which the planets were sup-
posedly embedded did not exist, why should science be unable to show that 
God does not exist?
Let us look at the case of the crystalline spheres. How did science show that 
they did not exist? The answer is simple: when the orbits of certain comets 
were first accurately described, it was seen that these comets passed through 
the crystalline spheres—or rather through the space these spheres would have 
occupied if they had existed. So everyone immediately concluded that the 
celestial spheres did not exist—even though all astronomers from the ancient 
Greeks to Copernicus had assumed that they did. So: scientists made certain 
observations; these established the orbits of certain comets and the fact that 
these orbits passed through the space supposedly occupied by the celestial 
spheres. Of course, it doesn’t logically follow from this fact that the spheres 
don’t exist. Logic, blind as justice, demands another premise: that comets can’t 
pass through crystalline spheres (spheres strong enough to bear the weight 
of the planets embedded in them). But this premise is pretty obvious and no 
one seriously thought of doubting it; as far as I know, no one bothered to state 
it explicitly. Observations, from the austere point of view of pure logic, can 
never establish that something does not exist. Before she will authorize you 
to conclude that something-or-other does not exist, logic will demand more 
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than a premise about how things look; she will demand a premise of the fol-
lowing form: if that “something-or-other” did exist, things wouldn’t look the 
way they do. Scientific observation is a refined way of finding out how things 
look; scientific observations can establish that something does not exist only 
when they are conjoined with a premise to the effect that if that thing exist-
ed, things would not look the way science says they look. There would seem, 
therefore to be only two cases in which science, science alone, can prove that 
X does not exist: when the ‘if things look such-and-such a way, then X does 
not exist’ statement that is conjoined with the observations of scientists is 
itself a statement that can be established by science, or when it is so obvious 
that it needs no support.
Science, therefore, can establish that God does not exist only if there is 
some scientific observation—or scientifically established fact or experimental 
result—such that we can look at it and say with confidence, That’s not how 
things would be if there were a God. And this ‘if ’ statement must either itself 
be scientifically established or so obvious that it doesn’t need to be “estab-
lished.” But all this is rather abstract. Let’s look at a possible example. I have 
heard some people argue as follows. “There are major design deficiencies in the 
human eye and the human knee. If God existed, and were even a moderately 
good engineer, these design deficiencies wouldn’t exist. But, of course, if God 
existed, he’d be a rather better than moderately good engineer. So God doesn’t 
exist.” Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that the design of the human eye 
and knee could be improved on. This is not the only premise of the argument. 
There is another premise, an ‘if ’ statement. Something like this:
If there were a God, human beings would exhibit optimal biologi-
cal  design.
What sort of statement is this? Is it a scientific statement? If it is, what science 
does it belong to? Theobiology? I think it should be evident that this is not 
a statement that has been established by any of the sciences. If the argument 
we are examining is to constitute a scientific disproof of the existence of God, 
therefore, this statement must be so obvious that everyone should just accept 
it—accept it without argument. Is this statement that obvious? It certainly doesn’t 
seem so to me. I can see myself believing this statement on the basis of some 
argument, but it doesn’t seem to me the sort of thing one could believe unless 
someone were aware of some consideration that could be adduced in its favor.
The statement ‘If there were a God, human beings would exhibit optimal 
biological design’, therefore, should not be accepted in the absence of any ar-
gument. Or, if that’s too strong a statement, at least this much is true: no one 
has to accept this statement in the absence of any argument for it. No one has 
the right to expect that of anyone. And this isn’t true of all statements. There 
are plenty of statements that I have the right to expect anyone to believe. If I 
am trying to convince you that Alice wasn’t in Memphis at the time the crime 
was committed, and my argument has the (probably unspoken) premise that 
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no one can travel from Oxford to Memphis in ten minutes, I have the right to 
expect you to accept that premise without argument. If you challenged me on 
that point, you would simply be wasting your time and mine. But if someone 
asserted the thesis, ‘If there were a God, human beings would exhibit optimal 
biological design’, and if you challenged him on that point, you would not be 
wasting his time and yours. He might have a good answer to your challenge, 
but it would be perfectly legitimate to ask to hear what this good answer was.
Now if someone did offer an argument for the truth of ‘If there were a God, 
human beings would exhibit optimal biological design’, what sort of argument 
would it be? Well, it would be a philosophical argument. What else could it 
be? Here is a reasonable principle: if some premise of an argument itself re-
quires an argument, and if any argument for that premise would have to be a 
philosophical argument, then the larger argument is a philosophical argument. 
Therefore, the argument
Human beings exhibit less than optimal biological design
If there were a God, human beings would exhibit optimal biologi-
cal  design
Hence,
There is no God
is a philosophical argument, not a scientific argument, despite the fact that its 
first premise (we have granted this) has been established by science. When it 
comes to classifying arguments, philosophy trumps science: if an argument has 
a single “philosophical” premise (a single premise that requires a philosophical 
defense), it is a philosophical argument. But an argument is a scientific argu-
ment only if all its premises are either propositions that have been established 
by science or else propositions so trivial that they require no defense.
I make bold to say: all arguments for the non-existence of God must be phil-
osophical arguments. So far as I can see, any argument for the non-existence 
of God must be of one of two types. First, it may be an impossibility argument. 
An impossibility argument for the non-existence of a thing is an attempt to 
show that the concept of that thing is internally self-contradictory or concep-
tually impossible—as impossible as a round square, although the impossibility 
may be harder to see (which is why an argument is needed to show that the 
impossibility exists). I shall not discuss impossibility arguments; none of them 
has (in my view) any merit whatever, and discussions of them tend to be 
rather technical—that is to say, extremely yawn-inducing in people who are 
not professional philosophers. I note only that it is pretty obvious that any 
impossibility argument would be a philosophical argument.
The second sort of argument is an argument that is based on some observed 
fact (or facts). We have already looked at an argument of this type—the “op-
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timal design” argument. The argument begins by stating the observed fact; it 
goes on to contend that this fact would not be a fact if there were a God, and 
concludes that there is no God. My thesis is that the second premise of any 
such argument, the if-then premise, will never be so evident as to require no 
argument and that any argument for it will have to be a philosophical argument. 
But why must this be? As we have seen, there are plenty of arguments for the 
non-existence of things that are based on observation and in which the second 
premise—the if-then premise—is sufficiently evident that it requires no defense. 
How can we be sure a priori that the case of God is different? If we can prove 
that the celestial spheres or astrological influences or spontaneously generated 
life do not exist without recourse to philosophy, how can we be confident that 
the non-existence of God cannot be proved without recourse to philosophy?
The answer is that there is a vast difference between God and any object 
or kind of thing that science has proved does not exist. Take the crystalline 
celestial spheres. These are really very much like the objects that we see and 
touch every day—it’s just that, if they existed, they’d be vastly larger than the 
objects that we see and touch every day. But God is not like that. The idea of 
God is not the idea of a being that is like that. I once saw a cartoon in which a 
fundamentalist preacher is informing his flock from the pulpit that God’s socks 
are as big as New Jersey and his tee-shirts are the size of Texas. That preacher 
had the wrong idea. If he had the right idea, it would certainly be possible 
to prove scientifically that there was no God. If there were such a being (at 
least if he were anywhere around here) we’d see him and we could measure 
his gravitational influence on, say, the orbits of satellites. And, anyway, there 
couldn’t be a solid, living man-shaped being of that size; not only would there 
be no possible source of energy for it, but the laws of physics simply wouldn’t 
permit it to live or even to maintain its structural integrity.
If God isn’t like that, what is God like? Or, for those who don’t believe in God, 
what is God supposed to be like? Well, to begin with, God is, or is supposed to 
be, omnipresent. As you might guess, this word means present everywhere. But 
this definition is ambiguous. Consider the luminiferous aether, that all-pervasive 
perfectly elastic subtle stuff that, according to nineteenth-century physics, stood 
to light as air stands to sound. According to the nineteenth-century theory of 
light, the luminiferous aether was everywhere—in a laboratory vacuum flask, 
inside the earth, at the center of every star—and it was therefore in the most 
literal sense of the word omnipresent. It was present everywhere because every 
region of space was filled with a part of it: one part of it was conterminous with 
the Mississippi River, another (a large ball-shaped part) occupied the same region 
of space as the star Arcturus, and so on. But God has no parts. The first of the 
Anglican Articles of Religion begins, “There is but one living and true God, . 
. ., without body [or] parts. . .  .” So God can’t be omnipresent in the sense that 
one part of him is in one place and another part in another place and some 
part in every place. In what sense, then, is God omnipresent? This question is 
best answered by means of an analogy. Consider a painting—say Rembrandt’s 
The Night Watch. There is, surely, a very good sense (even if it is not the most 
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literal sense) in which Rembrandt is present everywhere in that rather sizable 
painting. How does Rembrandt manage that? Obviously not by having one 
of his parts in one section of the painting and another of his parts in another 
section and at least one of his parts in every section. Rembrandt, unlike God, 
did have parts, but he didn’t manage to be present everywhere in The Night 
Watch by distributing them across the canvas. Rather, he managed it in this 
wise: his creative activity is present everywhere in the painting; everything, 
at every point in the painting is the way it is because it was Rembrandt’s will 
that it should be that way; he made it that way. This bit of black here, this bit 
of gold there . . . they’re all the way they are because those are the colors and 
shapes that Rembrandt’s will decreed for that spot. Similarly, God is present 
everywhere in the physical universe not because he is a space-occupying being 
who happens to be big enough to occupy all space (like the aether) but rather 
because every space-occupying being is a product of his creative power. This 
rock here, that elephant there, that neutron star over yonder, all exist and have 
the properties they do because it is God’s will that they should. Each exists from 
moment to moment and continues to be the kind of thing it is only because it 
is God’s will that it should continue to exist and be that way, and if God were 
to stop willing that, say, the neutron star, should continue to exist, it would 
vanish, all in an instant. And it is not only individual created objects that have 
this feature, this continuous moment-to-moment dependency on the will of 
God; the laws of physics, the basic rules by which the physical universe works, 
stay the same from moment to moment only because that is what God wills.
Perhaps I should remind you that I am not making any existential or on-
tological or factual claim when I say this. I am telling you not how things are 
but rather what concept the concept of God is. I am telling you what features 
a being would have to have to count as God. No being who is present in the 
physical universe otherwise than by the continuous exercise of its creative 
power would be God. If it should turn out that some immensely powerful 
and wise and ancient being made us, and if this being has a size and occupies 
space and has physical properties, and if there is no greater being than this, 
then the atheists are right: there is no God. If the immensely powerful and 
wise and ancient being who made us claimed to be God, it would be either 
an impostor or confused. An impostor if it claimed to be omnipresent, and 
confused if it admitted to being a physical thing that occupied space and still 
claimed to be God.
Omnipresence, omnipresence in the special sense I have been laying out, 
is, therefore, an essential part of the idea of God. And this implies that God 
can be connected with our observations of the physical world in only the most 
indirect and subtle of ways. The medieval philosophers said that a thing that 
was present in a region of space by literally occupying that region, by filling it 
up, was “locally present” in that region. They would have summed up what I 
have been telling you in these words: God is locally present nowhere and to-
tally present everywhere. (He is totally present everywhere in that the totality 
of his being is reflected in the sustaining power that keeps every spatial thing 
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everywhere in the physical universe in existence from moment to moment.) But 
consider. Only a locally present being can reflect light, and thus only a locally 
present being can be visible. Only a locally present being can exclude other 
beings from the space it occupies, and thus only a locally present being can be 
tangible. Thus, none of our sense-organs or instruments can possibly detect 
God, for they can detect only locally present things. Unbelievers sometimes 
challenge God to come out of hiding—they refer to him as “the hidden God.” 
But there is nothing God can do to come out of hiding, for he isn’t hidden. He 
isn’t the sort of being who could be either hidden or on display. 
And this is why his non-existence can’t be proved by science alone. Science 
can prove the non-existence only of things that exhibit some sort of local 
presence, like the celestial spheres or the luminiferous aether. If a medieval 
student had asked his astronomy teachers why we couldn’t see the celestial 
spheres, he would have been told that they were invisible because they were 
perfectly transparent. But, of course, you can prove the non-existence of a 
locally present but invisible thing, whether it’s Wells’s invisible man or the 
celestial spheres. It will have to manifest its local presence in some way, and 
everyone agreed that the celestial spheres manifested themselves in certain 
regions of space by being a real solid, presence there—one that would stop a 
comet dead in its tracks. God isn’t like that: he’s not invisible by being locally 
present but perfectly transparent; he’s invisible by not being locally present at 
all. The luminiferous aether is locally present everywhere, perfectly transparent 
(by definition), and intangible—at least in the sense that we can detect no 
resistance when we move a physical object through it. Nevertheless, the fact 
that it is locally present (even if uniformly so everywhere) has observational 
consequences. The earth moves around the sun in pretty nearly a circle, and 
the constant change of direction of the earth’s motion through the motionless 
aether that this implies would have certain consequences for the way light be-
haves; when we look for these consequences, we don’t find them, and they are 
of such a magnitude that, even a century ago, finding them was well within the 
competency of experimental physics. So, because of its local presence, the aether 
can have its existence disproved by science. God, however, being without local 
presence, is not in the business of having his existence disproved by science.
If what I have said is right, it does not mean that the existence of God can’t 
be disproved. What it means is that the proof will have to be something other 
than a scientific disproof (though it may indeed include premises that have 
been established by scientific investigation). It will have to be a philosophical 
disproof: God’s not being a locally present being means that the question of the 
relation between any observation and any statement about God will have to 
be a philosophical question. If anyone ever presents any argument of the form
We observe so-and-so, and not such-and-such
If there were a God, we should observe such-and-such, not so-and-so
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hence,
There is no God
that person has to be offering a philosophical argument because the second 
premise, the premise that tells us what we should observe if there were a God, 
will never be so self-evidently true that it doesn’t need any defense (this is be-
cause a being who is not locally present is so different from the kinds of beings 
our mental reflexes are used to dealing with), and the defense will have to be a 
philosophical one (because science, the only other possible source of a defense, 
deals only with locally present beings). I say this not because philosophy is above 
science, grander, made of finer intellectual clay, but simply because philosophy 
is the final home of all those questions about the general nature of things that 
we don’t know how to deal with in any decisive or compelling way. Science 
cannot, therefore, disprove the existence of God. I have now answered the 
question that is my title. But I have more to say. I want to go on to discuss the 
implications of inability of science to disprove the existence of God.
If science cannot disprove the existence of God, then any disproof of the 
existence of God must be philosophical—must take the form of a philosophical 
argument. This is what I have been trying to convince you of. But to what end? 
Why am I concerned to try to convince you that any successful argument for 
the non-existence of God must be a philosophical argument? Let me approach 
this question by means of a definition. Let us say that an argument for some 
conclusion is a compelling argument for that conclusion if any human being 
who carefully considered the argument, and who understood its premises and 
the reasoning by which the conclusion was derived from the premises, and who 
did not accept the conclusion would be positively irrational. This definition is 
not so stringent as to be useless. There are compelling arguments for certain 
conclusions. Mathematics is full of them; one famous example would be Euclid’s 
proof that there is no greatest prime. Here is a non-mathematical example. The 
great crackpot Emmanuel Velikovsky (there can be greatness in crackpottery) 
sets out in his book Worlds in Collision a theory according to which the earth 
has changed its direction of spin during the span of recorded human history. 
(His position is not that this reversal was a miracle; he contends that it was an 
event in the natural order.) Now anyone who has even the most elementary 
knowledge of physics will know that this is impossible. But let us leave physics 
aside. If such an event were to occur, the very least we could expect is that, 
at the moment of the reversal of the direction of the earth’s rotation, there 
would be violent earthquakes on every point on the surface of the earth. (Those 
who are not willing to leave physics aside will realize that this statement is 
comparable to the statement that if a hydrogen bomb were to go off in your 
bedroom, the very least you could expect is that the bedroom windows would 
be blown out.) So, if Velikovsky is right, there was some moment in, say, the 
last ten thousand years at which there were violent earthquakes all over the 
surface of the earth. But there is a compelling argument for the conclusion 
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that this thesis is false. (The argument is due to Isaac Asimov.) At many plac-
es in the world there are limestone caverns decorated by nature with those 
remarkable structures called stalactites and stalagmites—and these structures 
are as delicate as they are remarkable. A violent earthquake would cause them 
all to come crashing down. And they take hundreds of thousands of years to 
form. It follows that, at least at those places at which there are stalactites and 
stalagmites, there has been no earthquake during the last ten thousand years. 
And so Velikovsky is refuted. And this argument is my sense compelling. 
Anyone who understands it and does not reject at least Velikovsky’s thesis 
that the earth changed its direction of spin in the last ten thousand years is 
simply being irrational. (Strictly speaking, I suppose, the scientific reasons for 
thinking that stalactites and stalagmites take hundreds of thousands of years to 
form would have to be included in the reasoning for it to be truly compelling. 
But I think it would be irrational to reject expert testimony on this matter, 
and that is what geologists tell us.)
There are, therefore, compelling arguments—against there having been 
ubiquitous earthquakes in the last ten thousand years, against the existence 
the celestial spheres, against the existence of astrological influences. All these 
examples are arguments for the non-existence of various things. I have chosen 
them as examples because it is non-existence arguments that are our primary 
interest here. But, of course, I don’t mean to imply by my choice of examples 
that there aren’t also compelling arguments for the existence of various things. 
There is, for example, a compelling argument for the existence of a causal link 
between cigarette smoking and lung cancer.
But are there any compelling philosophical arguments? If so, what would 
they be? Let us look at a philosophical argument that I will use as an example 
simply because I think it’s a pretty good argument. First, a bit of stage-setting. 
Let’s say that one has free will if, when one is faced with a decision between 
two or more alternatives, one is at least sometimes able to choose either of 
them: each of them is open to one. Suppose, for example, that I’m trying to 
decide whether to admit to the offence the police have charged me with (and 
of which I’m indeed guilty) or to try to brazen it out. If I’m both able to confess 
and able to try to brazen it out, if both alternatives are open to me, then I have 
free will—at least on this particular occasion. And let’s say that determinism 
is the thesis that the past determines a unique future, that given the past and 
given the laws of nature, there’s only one way for things to go on. It seems 
pretty obvious to most people that determinism implies that no one has free 
will. It comes as a surprise to most undergraduate students of philosophy that 
many great philosophers have denied this—that many great philosophers have 
affirmed that one can have free will even if the past determines a unique future. 
(Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill are examples of great 
philosophers who have affirmed this.) But here’s a philosophical argument, 
which I think is pretty good, for the conclusion that these great philosophers 
were wrong—that their thesis is, as another great philosopher, Immanuel Kant, 
put it, “a wretched subterfuge.” Consider the case in which I’m trying to decide 
9
van Inwagen: Can Science Disprove the Existence of God?
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2004
6 x 9
whether to confess or to try to brazen it out. If determinism is true, one of the 
two alternatives I’m trying to decide between belongs to that one future that 
is determined to occur by what has already happened. Let’s suppose that the 
determined alternative is confession, that the past determines that I’m going 
to confess. If I have free will, then, although I’m in fact going to confess, it 
must be the case that I’m able to try to brazen it out. That is to say, a future in 
which I attempt to deceive the police must in some sense be open to me. But, 
given the past, such a future can occur only if there is a violation of the laws of 
nature. And how can a future in which a violation of the laws of nature occurs 
be open to me? How can I be able to do something such that, before I do it, a 
violation of the laws of nature must occur? It just seems evident that, if it was 
determined a million years before I was born that when a certain moment rolls 
round I’ll confess my crime to the police, it isn’t open to me to do anything 
else—I’m not able to do anything else. And it just seems evident, therefore, 
that Hobbes and Hume and Mill were wrong.
Well, there’s a philosophical argument. As I say, to me it seems to be a 
pretty good argument. But is it a compelling argument? That is, if someone 
understands it and continues to believe that one can have free will even in a 
world in which determinism rules, must we conclude that that person is sim-
ply irrational? If anyone one thinks this, he has to deal with an awkward fact: 
many very able philosophers reject this argument. I’d like to believe that the 
argument is compelling because, if for no other reason, I’ve spent a large part 
of my professional career defending various rather more technical versions of 
it. But if I am tempted to believe this, I have to consider an awkward fact: my 
great contemporary, the late Professor David Lewis of Princeton University, 
was aware of this argument and rejected its conclusion. And I am convinced 
that Lewis understood the argument perfectly. And, although he once asked 
me not to say this, he was smarter than I am, and a technically more able phi-
losopher to boot. I have simply enormous respect for Lewis; I cannot adequately 
convey to you the depth of this respect. I once heard a philosopher say, after 
hearing one of Lewis’s lectures, “Lewis is so smart it’s scary.” And I agree. Am 
I to believe that Lewis was irrational—for that’s what I must believe if I’m to 
believe that the argument I’ve laid out is compelling? I find I can’t believe that. 
In fact, I find that trying to believe that is like trying to believe that the sun is 
green or that pigs can fly. I can only conclude that the argument I’ve spent a 
large part of my professional life defending, whatever its merits may be, is not 
compelling. And, I must add, Lewis is not the only philosopher I respect who 
rejects this argument; there have been, and are, lots of others.
Our subject is arguments for the nonexistence of God—which, as I’ve tried 
to show, must be philosophical arguments. Let me lay those arguments aside for 
the moment. I’ll make a generalization: with the possible exception of some 
arguments for the nonexistence of God, there are no compelling arguments 
for any substantive conclusion in philosophy. I offer the following argument 
for this generalization (and if you’re waiting to catch me out in a contradic-
tion on this point, I’ll tell you right now that I don’t regard this argument as 
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compelling; I just think it’s a pretty cogent argument): on both sides in every 
important philosophical dispute there are extremely able philosophers. Are 
there objectively true moral principles, or is morally an entirely subjective 
matter? Can a purely physical thing be conscious? Do we really know anything, 
or is knowledge an illusion? Has the state the right to compel us to do things 
that benefit others but not ourselves? Is it in principle possible for science to 
explain why there is anything at all? For each of these questions, you can find 
able philosophers who will answer it Yes, others who will answer it No, and 
some who will say Maybe.
I think we must admit, therefore, that a pretty strong—but not, of course, 
compelling—case can be made for the conclusion that there are no compelling 
arguments in philosophy (with the possible exception of arguments for the 
non-existence of God)—no proofs. Now someone may point out that proof is 
a very strong word, and that in the practical business of life (and in science as 
well) we are often satisfied with something a good deal weaker than proof. If 
I am apprehended walking out of a jeweler’s shop with thousands of dollars’ 
worth of the shop’s diamonds in a concealed pocket in my overcoat, that 
doesn’t prove I’m a jewel thief. Maybe the concealed pocket is there for some 
innocent reason, and perhaps someone slipped the diamonds into the pocket 
to frame me. It happens all the time in the movies. Still, as Thoreau said, 
“Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout in the 
milk”—meaning that that’s very good evidence that the dairy is watering the 
milk. The evidence I have imagined may not constitute a proof that I am a 
thief, but it would probably be enough to get me convicted of theft in a court 
of law, and it would provide anyone who knew about it with a very good reason 
for thinking that I was a thief.
Has philosophy produced any good reasons for thinking that anything of 
philosophical interest is so? In one sense, at least, the answer to this question 
must be Yes. But let us be careful about what we mean. Suppose that Fred’s 
Aunt Alice has been found strangled, and that it’s well known that Fred hated 
her; that (despite his feelings towards her) she had named him as the sole heir 
to her entire, very large, fortune; that Fred is deeply in debt, and that he is a 
large, powerful man, twice convicted of assault with intent to do bodily harm, 
while Aunt Alice was a feeble old woman; and, finally, that Fred is unable to 
account for his whereabouts at the time the murder was committed. Do these 
facts together constitute a good reason for thinking that he murdered her? 
Well, they certainly constitute some sort of reason. If the police detective in 
charge of the investigation, in full possession of all these facts, said, “There’s 
no reason whatever to believe that it was Fred who strangled Alice,” this 
would probably cause his colleagues to wonder whether he might be losing 
his professional grip. On the other hand, the existence of all these reasons for 
believing that Fred is the murderer is perfectly consistent with the existence 
of reasons for believing that he isn’t. Suppose, for example, that the police 
have found the fingerprints of an unknown person—definitely not Fred’s—on 
several articles in the room in which Alice was murdered, that there are shreds 
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of cloth under Alice’s fingernails that match none of Fred’s garments, and that 
there are fresh footprints under one of the windows of the room in which Alice 
was murdered that were made by shoes too small for Fred to squeeze his feet 
into. If these were all the relevant facts, it would seem to be reasonable to say 
that, although there are reasons that support the hypothesis that Fred is the 
murderer, there are reasons that count against this hypothesis, too, and that 
neither set of reasons is self-evidently strong enough to outweigh the other. It 
would seem reasonable to say this, but, human nature being what it is, people 
may still have opinions. One can imagine a detective saying, “Well, of course 
we haven’t yet got anything we can take to court, but I always bet on motive 
and opportunity. I think Fred did it. He could have bought a jacket at some 
second-hand clothiers and discarded it afterwards. Maybe the footprints are 
a trick—he could have split open a small pair of shoes and then taped the 
split shoes so that they’d stay on his feet. Just the kind of trick someone who 
knew he would be the one obvious suspect might use to try to throw us off the 
track. And as for the fingerprints—well, I’ve seen enough cases to know that 
there are often unaccounted-for fingerprints at the scene of a crime. Mark 
my words, we’ll pin it on him sooner or later.” And one can imagine another 
detective weighing the evidence pro et contra differently and coming to just 
the opposite conclusion. One can imagine interminable arguments between 
the two detectives about these different ways of weighing the opposing bodies 
of evidence. If one did, one would be imagining a conversation a lot like a 
conversation in which two philosophers are disputing about the objectivity 
of morality or the freedom of the will or the relation of consciousness to the 
physical events in the brain.
Sadly, there is no uniformity of opinion in philosophy. A German aphorism 
defines a professor as someone who thinks otherwise, and this aphorism cer-
tainly applies to professors of philosophy. The historian Peter Geyl said that 
history—the academic field—was “argument without end.” This description 
fits philosophy better than it fits history. The German general Ludendorff told 
Clemenceau that the historians of the twenty-first century would say that the 
Great War was the fault of Britain and France. Clemenceau replied that he 
didn’t know what the historians of the twenty-first century would say, but he 
did know what they wouldn’t say: they wouldn’t say that Belgium had invaded 
Germany. The lesson of this well-known anecdote is that even in history there 
is a great deal that is beyond dispute. But in philosophy, there is really very 
little that is beyond dispute. If you want an argument for that thesis, I offer this 
one: there is very little that isn’t disputed. It is indeed possible in philosophy 
to advance good reasons for one’s views; unfortunately, in every case I know of 
in which one can do this, it is equally possible for the opponents of one’s views 
to advance good reasons for their views—and it never seems to be the case that 
the good reasons that can be advanced in support of a view decisively outweigh 
the good reasons that can be advanced in support of the opposing view. Of 
course, philosophers commonly think that their own views do have this feature: 
a philosopher who, for example, thinks that there is an objective morality will 
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probably think that the reasons he or she has for thinking that there is an 
objective morality decisively outweigh the reasons that other philosophers 
have for thinking that there is no objective morality. But this philosopher 
will find it easy to believe this only if he ignores a very important question, 
to wit, If there are these good reasons for believing that there is an objective 
morality, and if they decisively outweigh the reasons that other philosophers 
have for thinking that there is no objective morality, and if they are the very 
reasons that you are in possession of and which convince you that there is an 
objective morality—why don’t they convince everyone, or everyone that can 
understand these reasons, or failing this, almost everyone? Shouldn’t reasons 
for believing something that decisively outweigh the reasons that support the 
opposing position have that power? We can confront our philosopher with 
this challenge: Why don’t all, or almost all, philosophers agree with you? 
What is it with these philosophers who take other positions than yours? Are 
they just stupid? Is it that they don’t understand the reasons you say decisively 
support the position you take? Are they intellectually dishonest? Are they 
psychologically weak—do they get some sort of psychological thrill or com-
fort from believing that there is no objective morality, and therefore hold on 
to this position even though it isn’t rationally defensible? Are they perhaps 
simply wicked? If you think any of these things—well, isn’t that convenient 
for you. If you’re right, then you’re smarter or nicer or more rational than a 
lot of other people in the same profession as yourself. Aren’t you lucky that 
it was you who turned out to be the smart or nice or rational one? And, of 
course, that there is an objective morality isn’t the only philosophical position 
you hold. You probably hold dozens of philosophical positions, all of which, 
you think, are decisively supported by the reasons you advance in support of 
them. And in each of these dozens of cases, there are other philosophers who 
hold positions inconsistent with yours. What an amazing coincidence: there 
is one person who holds the right position on dozens of questions, probably 
the only person who holds that particular combination of
positions, and it just happens to be you.
If any philosopher is willing to answer all these questions by saying, “Yes—it 
certainly is amazing. I’m the only one who is right on these dozens of philo-
sophical issues, and it’s because I’m either smarter or more rational or nicer 
or more intellectually courageous than the philosophers who disagree with 
me,” then what can we say to that philosopher? I know what I would say. I 
would tell that philosopher that he or she was a comic figure. Of course, few 
philosophers would make the little speech I’ve imagined. Of all the philos-
ophers I’ve forced to confront the fact of pervasive philosophical disagree-
ment—and there have been quite a few—only one has said anything like it. 
And yet philosophers do continue to hold and defend philosophical positions, 
and they regard the arguments they present in support of these positions as 
having decisive advantages over the arguments of those philosophers who 
hold opposing positions. (I have met only one philosopher who claimed to 
take no position on any philosophical question.) And I cannot except my-
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self from this charge. I take positions on many philosophical questions, and I 
think that my reasons for holding them decisively outweigh the reasons that 
those philosophers who disagree with me have for holding the positions they 
do. I really cannot say what justifies me in taking this position. If you force me 
to try to justify it, I will say something like this: The arguments I can give in 
support of, say, the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism (a 
philosophical position I hold) cannot be the totality of my reasons for accepting 
this thesis. If they were, and if they really outweighed, outweighed decisively, 
all the arguments for the compatibility of free will and determinism, then I 
ought to be able to convert at least a goodly number of those philosophers who 
think that free will is compatible with determinism to my own view simply by 
presenting them with my arguments. After all, that’s what Einstein was able 
to do with respect to his revolutionary views on motion, light, mass, inertia, 
and gravity. He published some arguments, and after a few years of thinking 
it over, the community of physicists saw things his way. I think that some of 
my reasons for thinking that free will is incompatible with determinism must 
be inarticulable and hence incommunicable—unlike Einstein’s reasons for 
the theses that are associated with his name—which could be written down 
and passed on to others. A pretty feeble response, you may say, and I’ll have 
to admit that you’re right. It’s just that I can’t think of anything non-feeble 
to say in defense of holding a philosophical position on which so many able 
philosophers who perfectly understand my published arguments disagree with 
me. I have only two consolations. The first is that all other philosophers—
with the exception of the fellow I mentioned who, or so he says, accepts no 
philosophical theses—are in the same boat. The second is that there are other 
passengers in this boat than philosophers—quite a lot of them, in fact. For 
example, the name of almost everyone who holds political views of any sort is 
to be found on her passenger list.
Suppose, just to simplify matters, that there are only two political positions: 
call them Left and Right. Suppose you are an adherent of one of these posi-
tions—let us say the Left. Your position, that of the Left, will be a amalgam 
of various theses. For example: That people are, in general, better off when 
the Left party is in power than when the Right party is in power. That the 
policies of the Right party, although publicly defended by appeal to abstract 
principles, in reality reflect the interests of large multi-national corporations. 
That members of the political Left are, in general, more intelligent, better 
educated, and more compassionate than members of the political Right. That 
capital punishment is an ineffective deterrent to murder. That a three-month 
old fetus is not a human being. That there would be less use of hard drugs if 
they were legal and under strict control. And so on and so on. (In giving these 
examples of theses of which the political position of the Left is an amalgam, 
I have deliberately not used moral terms like ‘should’ or ‘unfair’, despite the 
fact that most people will immediately begin to talk in moral terms if you ask 
them to describe their politics. I have avoided these terms because I wanted to 
present what are uncontroversially a set of theses, and many philosophers believe 
Can Science Disprove the Existence of God?    51
14
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 34 [2004], No. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol34/iss1/3
6 x 9
that statements couched in moral terms, statements like ‘The state should, 
before all other things, ensure the fair distribution of goods and services’, are 
not properly speaking theses, but rather the expressions of attitudes.) Now do 
you think, as a member of the Left, that there are reasons that support these 
theses to which you subscribe, reasons that decisively outweigh the reasons 
the members of the Right could adduce in support of their own—of course 
contrary—theses? If you really are an adherent of the Left, it is very probable 
that you do. But if you spend any time arguing with someone of your own level 
of intelligence and education on the Right, you will find that the exchange of 
arguments bears a disquieting resemblance to the arguments of the philosophers 
about free will or materialism or the objectivity of morality. That is, neither 
of you will convince the other: the reasons that seem to you to be decisive 
arguments in favor of your position will seem to the other to be answerable 
and he or she will be happy to give you the answers. Of course, you won’t think 
that these answers are effective answers to your arguments, but it will be quite 
plain that your opponent will think they are. In fact, if both of you have any 
capacity for abstract thought, you will see that what you are arguing about is 
just exactly philosophy—political philosophy. And if you have any capacity 
for self-doubt—a very big if indeed—you will begin to  wonder whether the 
arguments you can advance in favor of the theses you hold really do decisively 
outweigh the arguments that your colleague on the Right has advanced for the 
contrary positions. But all this about politics is an aside—an attempt to convince 
you that it isn’t only in philosophy that people believe things without having 
compelling arguments for them. My point is that—with the possible exception 
of arguments for the non-existence of God—all philosophical arguments for 
any position are less than compelling. 
Now, what about this possible exception? Is it indeed plausible to hold 
that philosophy is capable of providing a compelling argument for exactly 
one substantive thesis? Is it plausible to hold that philosophy can provide a 
compelling argument for the non-existence of God, even though she is unable 
to provide a compelling argument for any other substantive thesis? I have to 
say that this seems implausible to me. It seems antecedently highly improbable 
that philosophy, in whose house there have been debated scores (at least) of 
important questions, should be able to provide a decisive answer to exactly one 
of them. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should be able to answer 
the question ‘Do we have free will?’—but no other substantive philosophical 
question. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should be able to answer 
the question ‘Are thoughts events in the brain?’—but no other substantive 
philosophical question. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should be 
able to answer the question ‘Does mathematics treat of an objective reality 
that exists independently of the physical world?’—but no other substantive 
philosophical question. One would expect that either philosophy would be 
able to answer lots of the questions that philosophy has posed or else would be 
able to answer none of them. There is something suspicious about the number 
one, about uniqueness. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should 
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be able to answer the question ‘Does God exist?’—but no other substantive 
philosophical question. Still, highly implausible things, or things that at one 
point in the history of thought seemed highly implausible, have turned out to 
be true. It seemed implausible at one point in history to suppose that the solid 
earth beneath our feet was in rapid motion, but it turned out to be true. Fur-
ther investigation of this question would require a detailed examination of the 
available arguments for the non-existence of God—the argument from evil, for 
example. But such further investigation would be beyond the scope of this essay. 
My hope is that reflection on my two conclusions—that any argument for the 
non-existence of God must be a philosophical argument, and that philosophy 
has so far failed to establish any other substantive conclusion—will at least raise 
substantial doubts about whether it is possible to prove the non-existence of 
God. Perhaps someone will be eager to point out to me that if the line of rea-
soning I have presented is cogent, a parallel line of reasoning, equally cogent, 
would establish the impossibility of proving the existence of God. But this I 
concede. I believe in God, but I think it entirely implausible to suppose that 
there is or could be an argument that proves his existence. The impossibility 
of such an argument in no way troubles me, since I believe in lots of things 
whose existence I can’t prove. I think, in fact, that everyone—or at least every 
normal person—believes things he or she is unable to prove. Everyone who is 
willing to affirm any substantive philosophical or political thesis, for example. 
I think, to mention one important case, that all atheists believe things they are 
unable to prove—and I don’t criticize them on this ground, for I see nothing 
wrong per se with believing things one is unable to prove. But I do think that 
there is an asymmetry between theism and atheism in the matter of opinions 
about proof. If I may judge from reading the controversial writings of atheists, 
and by my correspondence and conversation with atheists, most of atheists 
think—at any rate, a great many of them think—that there is some scientific 
or philosophical argument that proves that God does not exist. The proportion 
of present-day theists who believe that the existence of God can be proved 
by some sort of scientific or philosophical argument, however, seems to me 
to be much smaller. It seems to me, therefore, that theists are generally more 
realistic about the epistemic status of theism than atheists are as regards the 
epistemic status of atheism.
The University of Notre Dame
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